November 11, 1965, Ap Bau Bang, S Vietnam

Historical Background

Early planning for Vietnam by the Joint Chiefs of Staff excluded armor. The vast difference in terrain between the plains of Europe and the thick, nearly impenetrable forests of Southeast Asia was the primary reason. It was General Westmoreland himself who stated in his first request for troops, “Vietnam is no place for armor or mechanized troops.” It was felt that APCs and tanks were largely road bound and would be of little use where roads were almost non-existent. 

When the 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One) had its papers cut to go to Vietnam, its armored wing was left back at home. The Army Chief of Staff allowed only the divisional cavalry, the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (The 1/4) to keep their M-48 tanks. 

The reason why the 1/4 was allowed to tag along was to test armor’s effectiveness in Vietnam in order to prove once and for all that it had no place there. The proof came, of course, but it would be just the opposite of what the “Big wheels” had anticipated (And how many other times has that happened!).

Another factor considered detrimental to the deployment of armored units in Vietnam was that the resources available to MACV were limited. President Johnson at that point was still putting serious limitations on troop ceilings. Westmoreland, therefore, had to make every man count. 

In a mechanized battalion, there are about 900 soldiers; in an infantry battalion, about 100 less. The mech battalion, moreover, required another 150 men for maintenance as well as additional men to guard the repair facilities. 

Similarly, a tank battalion required 570 men, of whom only 220 were actually combatants. Thus, the majority supported the minority who actually did most of the fighting. Given the severe constraints posed by manpower ceilings, it seemed that armor could not offer enough “bang for the buck.” This was soon proven not to be the case.

The first six months in Vietnam were quite frustrating for the armored unit. They were really never given a chance to prove their worth in combat in Vietnam. After arriving, they were split up into numerous smaller groups and spread all over the country. The primary duty of the APCs was that of convoy escort for the supply trains moving men, equipment and other goods to the points of battle. 

The tanks initially were not used at all. By the end of October, however, a relentless and determined enemy was making things much tougher for the Allied forces in Vietnam. It was decided that some other method of overcoming the deteriorating situation must be found. The high command relented on its negativity against the use of armor in combat and began to send out tanks on recon sweeps.

The mechanized forces felt the stress of their situation. They had been trained to work together, as a cohesive unit. They would finally get to prove themselves in a sharp action some 30 miles north of Saigon near the village of Ap Bau Bang. After hours of actively searching the zone assigned to them, the small task force, named Bledsoe, after its commander, Captain Arnold E. Bledsoe had called it a day. 

Even in November, the heat was oppressive, and an afternoon monsoon had only added to the weight of the humidity in the air. Mosquitoes were rampant, and the men doubted that they would get much rest that night. In fact, they would get no rest, and not because of the mosquitoes.

After stringing barbed wire, establishing listening posts, and making sure that a reasonable field of fire was open 350 degrees around them, the men began to seek some much needed rest. The night was passed quietly.