The Wargamer

It is a delight to see Osprey publishing hard cover books in addition to their superb shorter soft cover books. The Yom Kippur War by Simon Dunstan is the first Osprey hard cover book I have covered and the quality is superb. Simon Dunstan offers a very complete look at both fronts of the war and details some of the legendary small-unit engagements of the conflict.

The book begins with a brief discussion of how the opposing sides arrived at the starting point of October 6, 1973. Though this portion is succinct, it does include timeline chronology which helps readers plot the points from June 1967 through the completion of the October War.

The Yom Kippur War separates the Sinai Front and the Golan Heights Front into separate sections of the book. Dunstan reviews the opposing battle plans, opposing armies, and opposing commanders in the Sinai first. Significant time and effort on each of these areas help the reader understand that the Egyptian army had been completely retooled to fight for the specific objectives of the planned limited offensive action into Sinai. The discussion also covers what the Israeli approach for their Bar-Lev Line and how they attempted to make the most of improved positions and fortifications. The Egyptians' meticulous planning for breaching the sand ramparts of the Bar-Lev line is one of the most fascinating aspects of the Sinai campaign and among the Osprey plates included is a terrific one by Kevin Lyles showing them working to accomplish one of those breakdowns.

The sketches of the individual commanders are compelling and Dunstan also includes their fates after the war as he helps present a very full picture of the commanders ranging from Ariel Sharon to Egypt's Sa'ad Al Shazly. Dunstan does point out that there is very little information available on the individual Egyptian field commanders.

One interesting snippet included is that an Israeli Lieutenant, Benjamin Tov, informed his superiors that an Egyptian attack was imminent on October 1st. Because Tov's conclusions did not fit the Israeli intelligence picture of the situation they were ignored and Tov was removed from his post. After the war Tov was reinstated with a promotion to Captain as the result of the Agranat Commission which reviewed the Israeli conduct of the war. Israel had plenty of indications that war was imminent, through observations of Soviet shipping leaving and Mossad reports, but chose to believe that Egypt and Syria would remain at status quo in detente. The Israeli planning always assumed they would have a 48 hour 'war warning' which they considered sufficient to mobilize and deploy their reserves. Through mistakes and miscalculations that window vanished as the surprise attacks on two fronts stunned their military command.

The first line of defense in the Sinai was the Bar-Lev line along the Suez Canal. The line was manned by only 436 Reservists of the Jerusalem Etzioni Brigade. They were deployed in 18 of the fortified positions and 4 observation posts with the remainder unmanned. Amazingly, one strongpoint known as 'Budapest' never surrendered and was eventually relieved. The rest were overwhelmed by the Egyptian forces which included 4000 infantry in the first assault wave as many of them had been forced away from their firing positions due to intensive artillery bombardment. Two hours after the initial assault, the Egyptians had 10 brigades, numbering around 25,000 men across the Suez and penetrating the Sinai to setup bridgeheads. By the end of October 6th, the Egyptians had pushed around 500 tanks across the Canal in support of these bridgeheads. The plan was to remain under their SAM umbrella and to heavily use Sagger infantry anti-tank missiles to blunt the expected counter-attacks by Israeli armor. Dunstan's information on the battle of the Israeli 252nd Armor Division to stem the invasion is riveting, as the Division suffered 60% losses with little success, including all but two tanks destroyed of 14th Brigade under Amnon Reshef in the central sector. Those two tanks managed to withstand a force of 50 Egyptian tanks through the first night of battle at Firdan crossroads.

It is clear from The Yom Kippur War that the Israeli command structure did not acquit itself well in the early going. Moshe Dayan, despite the mystique that still surrounds his name, can clearly be seen dithering on the initial mobilization and then recommending a withdrawal to a defense line at Mitla and Gidi passes. This was rejected by General David Elazar, the Israeli Chief of Staff. The Israeli commanders were also slow to appreciate that the Egyptian tactics had changed.  The fact that the Egyptian infantry was now equipped with the Sagger missiles constituted a significant threat to unsupported armor and the Israelis discounted the initial travails of the 252nd Division's three Brigades believing that their piecemeal commitment was the problem. This led to the failed counter-attack of the 162nd Armored Division under General 'Bren' Adan with tremendous losses due to the lack of both infantry and artillery support. The 143rd Division, under Sharon, also was blunted, but the rewards of their attack were manifested in identifying the 'Chinese Farm' area as a weak point and the dividing line between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies.

The decision was made by Israel to stabilize the Sinai Front and deal with the danger posed in the Golan Heights following the failure of the counter-attack. Due to pressure from Syria to help relieve an evolving Israeli counter-attack in the Golan, Shazly was ordered to mount an attack on October 14th. Dunstan's prose clearly indicates Shazly did not believe this attack would succeed. He was ordered to commit the operational reserves to the attack, so as to not weaken the bridgeheads, and this had a huge bearing on the final outcome of the Sinai battle. The counter-attack did fail and also helped Israel reach a decision on the eventual counter-attack across the Suez. The Yom Kippur War does a masterful job of examining the Chinese Farm battle and Operation Gazelle, the attack across the Canal. The actions of the Israelis, the conflict between their senior commanders, and the eventual success at slicing through and crossing the Canal to eventually envelop the Egyptian 3rd Army against the looming cease-fire make for terrific reading.

Section two of The Yom Kippur War tackles the Golan Front. In what remains one of the great accomplishments of modern military history, the initial Israeli force of one under-strength armored brigade with around 200 tanks, two infantry battalions and four batteries of self-propelled artillery fought against the Syrian forces of 1300 tanks, 6000 men and roughly 800 guns and kept them from overrunning the Golan before hastily deployed Israeli reserves were able to blunt the offensive.

Dunstan offers more information on the Israeli commanders than the Syrian ones, but does focus on Omar Abrash, the commander of the Syrian 7th Infantry Division, whose death in battle on October 8th may have been one of the early turning points of the fight for the Golan Heights.

Every aspect of the battle is covered well, some in hour-by-hour detail. Dunstan does an excellent job of carrying the reader along with his stimulating narrative. A terrific feature of the book is the myriad of pictures from both sides. These are a wonderful compliment to Dunstan's terse, yet informative text as he follows the most important moments from the unfolding battles. The Golan section features several plates by Howard Gerrard and they are stellar paintings of some of the key moments of the early action.

The coverage of the battle for the Golan Heights is both more intense and more compact than the section on the Sinai. This accurately reflects the desperate compressed nature of the battle for Israel as they quickly came to believe their dire danger of the invasion rolling through the Golan into Israel proper. The entire section is enthralling reading and though this reviewer was very familiar with both the War and the battle, there were many nuggets of new information learned in the detailing of the Golan.

The close nature of the Golan’s landscape is clear when contrasted with the more sweeping accounts of the Sinai battle. The 7th Brigade's stand at the Valley of Tears is truly one of the most intrepid defenses fought in military history. The Brigade fought without sleep for 80 hours and continuously for 50 hours. They lost all but seven of their tanks, but inflicted losses of 260 tanks and 500 other vehicles on the Syrians, and kept them from linking up with their infantry in the El Rom sector, which would have left nothing standing between them until Northern Israel. That battle and the initial defense against the overwhelming portions of the early attack help make this section more heart-stirring than the earlier coverage of the Sinai.

Dunstan spends time examining the Israeli Air Force and Navy's involvement in the war, but at its heart The Yom Kippur War is mostly devoted to telling the tale of the tanks and infantry actions of the three sides. Dunstan concludes the book with covering how the war ended and how the battlefields look today.

Without reservation, I recommend TheYom Kippur War to any reader interested in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The earnest narrative, the myriad of pictures, the distinctive plates and the host of maps make this book the finest I have read on the War.

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