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When Gaming Meets History #22: Lightning War!

	Author: Bill Wilder Article Type: Editorial Publication Date: 12/11/2005 Related Categories: World War II, Background / Research Material, Military Training

A New Philosophy of Warfare

Doctrine often determines victory. The German Army and French leaders spent the 1930s building up modern armies, producing hundreds of tanks and other types of armored fighting vehicles. It is quite apparent that both countries had a healthy respect for the tank and both strongly believed in its used in modern war. The divergence came at the point of how these steel monsters were to be employed. 

France saw the tank in a largely supporting role, with the infantryman still the predominant factor in the battle. Tanks had a place, but it was a subordinate one to the foot soldier. It was the man with the rifle, not the steel box with the cannon that would win the war. This led to a philosophy of using armor primarily in a support role for the infantry.

Germany, on the other hand, while fully recognizing the value of the individual soldier (Hitler often quoted an ancient Teutonic saying that "Wherever the German soldier placed his foot, that ground belonged to him."), the tank was seen as an independent weapon. It would be used in support of course, but it also had a role of its own. The tank was mobile, powerful, and terrifying. 

The Wehrmacht saw the tank as an aggressive weapon, a battering ram or a razor-sharp sword that could be used to slice, hack, or otherwise crush an opponent. Tanks would be the German’s wedge, not the soldier, that would crack open the enemy's defenses. Armor would not be static, or parceled out in small packages to larger infantry formations to support their advance. 

For the Germans, the tank was the heart of the advance. The tank in turn would be supported by the infantryman, artillery and airpower. The attack would be overwhelming!

Concentration and Cohesion

As a corollary to this philosophy, the German Army realized the need for large tank formations to work together in unison. If there is strength in numbers, then there was massive power in larger numbers of tanks concentrating their effort on an enemy position. With their mobility, once a breakthrough was achieved, tanks could move quickly into the enemy's rear, creating havoc. 

The resultant confusion would have a rapid and devastating effect on the front-line troops. Knowing that the enemy has marauding pieces of nearly invulnerable machinery roaming at will behind you will unnerve the most valiant soldier. Breakthrough and exploitation were the watchword of the panzer corps.

These two fundamental differences would prove to be the undoing of the French Army as it struggled to defend its homeland against the German invader. And it was not that the French tanks were inferior, although certain shortsightedness in their design and construction (such as the one-man turret) would prove to be detrimental in the fighting. The real problems with the French armor were not in the vehicle, but in its employment. 

Entire armored divisions would be sent out in battalion or company strength to support infantry and their positions. An armored battalion outnumbered five to one had little chance of victory. While the French dissipated their strength, the Germans were busy concentrating theirs.

This, coupled with the concept of an independent, cohesive unit, such as the panzer division, gave the Germans an edge in battle that could not be overcome in the first years of World War Two. In most cases, the armored division of the German army included not only tanks, but also motorized or mechanized infantry, who were specifically trained to fight alongside the tanks. 

Also an integral part of the formation was its own artillery support, engineering units, reconnaissance, and anti-tank forces. Basically the division was a complete entity in itself and could, at least for a time, operate completely independent of other units.

The Wehrmacht had capitalized on the ideas of others and reduced them to a very practical, effective application. The stunning triumph over Polish, French, and British troops did not necessarily make the German soldier a "superman." It was, rather, the way German assets were employed that brought them victory after victory. When opposing forces began to study the German way of making war, and adopting some of the ideas, the tide of war began to change in their favor.

All of this is vital to an understanding of the collapse of the French Army and the British Expeditionary Force in 1940. The Germans were initially outnumbered by three to two. The French had almost twice as many tanks as their enemy, many of which were superior in firepower and protection. How then, could Germany as the attacker, be so successful when the given ratio for the force making the attack is three attackers for every one defender? It was in philosophy and methodology that Germany overcame the odds.