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When Gaming Meets History #28: Prokhorovka: The Deciding Battle of Kursk

	Author: Bill Wilder Article Type: Editorial Publication Date: 11/23/2006 Related Categories: World War II, Armor Combat, Background / Research Material, Eastern Front

The Fuhrer's Concern

Hitler, on this occasion, vacillated. When speaking of Operation Citadel he told those closest to him that the very thought of this battle caused his stomach to churn. Perhaps the Fuhrer realized that this was the "do or die" battle for Germany. Win it, and the campaign for conquering the western half of Russia would be kept alive. Lose it, and the loss would be the harbinger of an ultimate total defeat of the Third Reich. No one will ever know what he thought.

What was known was that Hitler had reservations. The loss at Stalingrad seemed to have taken the blind assurance for which he had been known away from him. He wanted to be absolutely sure that victory would be his. The losses suffered in and around Stalingrad at the end of the previous year had so weakened the offensive punch of the Wehrmacht that it would be some months into 1943 before anything like the earlier German offensives could be executed.

So in order to be certain of a victory, he would need time to prepare his attacking forces. This period of preparation was first designated to end in May. It was then postponed for another month. The newest tank in the German inventory, the Mark V Panther was in production, but would enough of them be ready in time? There was also the new self-propelled tank killer called the Ferdinand that Hitler wanted to be involved in the fighting in some quantity.

The introduction of the Tiger a few months earlier had startled the Russians, much as the T-34 had startled the German tankers in 1941. The coming of the Panther would enhance the use of the Tiger and give the tankers of the Panzerwaffe a vehicle specifically designed to kill the T-34 or any other piece of Soviet armor then on the field. The first use of the Panther at Kursk was less than impressive but this was due to a lack of testing and fine tuning the tank before sending it into combat. More Panthers were lost to mechanical malfunction than to Soviet fire. Eventually, however, it would become the best medium tank of World War Two. The initial rush to get it off the assembly lines and into action would be the source of much grief to German armored commanders as the battle got under way.

The Germans had amassed a powerful force. To the north, under von Kluge (the 9th Army) were poised six armored and five infantry divisions with all their support units. In the south, the brilliant General von Manstein would provide two armies, the Fourth Armored and Detachment Kempf. Together they mustered eleven armored and five infantry divisions.

Some of the most intricate and deadly defenses ever imagined were prepared and in great depth. The Russians wanted the Germans to attack. They wanted to bleed and kill the German army. This was a showdown that would please the Soviets.

There was intense debate over the outcome of such a titanic battle among the high command in the German army. As previously noted, even Hitler admitted to his staff that his stomach churned at the thought of such a gamble. He apparently recognized that the fate of the war in Russia would hinge on this momentous conflict.

Still, there seemed to be no other choice. The Fuhrer despised retreat and desperately wanted to go back to the offensive. This was the ideal place. April had been the ideal time. But it was July, and it was too late. Like a giant machine set in motion, the plans and preparations had come too far to stop now. The battle for Kursk would take place.

The Russian Anticipation

By the end of June, the Germans were finally ready. But so were the Russians. Through an intricate and reliable spy network known as "the Lucy Ring" the Russian high command was well informed about the German plan and began stuffing the Kursk bulge with every weapon and man it could spare.

The forces grew until elements of three Russian "Fronts" were packed into a tiny area. It included Rokossovsky's Central Front (the northern sector), Vatutin's Voronesh Front (Southern sector) and Konev's Steppe or Reserve Front. Remember, the term "Front," when referring to the Soviet army, was the equivalent of an army group, not a battle line as the word suggests.

It would be Marshall Georgi Zhukov who would coordinate the defenses and counteroffensives at Kursk. With information supplied by the infamous spy ring within the higher echelons of German command, Zhukov was fully aware of the enemy's intentions. As early as April 12th, he conferred with Stalin in Moscow.

Quietly listening, Stalin puffed his pipe and nodded his head. Though the Premier considered Zhukov a threat to his authority, there was no refuting his talents as a military leader. Stalin needed Zhukov at this point in the war. He knew full well that he would later have an opportunity to put the Marshal back into obscurity, or so he thought. Stalin agreed with the successful commander. The area in the salient would be strongly reinforced with three concentric belts of mines, antitank guns, artillery and fortified infantry positions. In reserve would be a huge force of tank-heavy units for a swift and brutal counterattack.