| It is only repeating an ancient maxim in war to say,
"That he who divides his force will be beaten in detail." If you are about to
give battle, strain every nerve to get together as many troops as you possibly can, for
they never can be employed to better purpose. Almost every general who has neglected this
rule, has found ample reason to repent of it.
Albemarle's detachment, which was beaten at Oudenarde, lost the great Eugene the whole
campaign; and Gen. Stahrenberg was beaten at the battle of Villa Viciosa in Spain, by
being separated from the English troops.
Detachments have also proved very fatal to the Austrians in the latter campaigns that
they have made in Hungary. The Prince of Hildbourghausen was defeated at Banjaluka, and
General Wallis suffered a check on the banks of the Timok. The Saxons also were beaten at
Kesseldorf, for want of having joined Prince Charles, as they could have done. I
should have been defeated at Sohr, and deservedly too, if presence of mind in my generals,
and valor in my troops, had not rescued me from such misfortune. It may be asked, are we
then never to send out detachments? My reply is, that it is a business of so delicate a
nature, as never to be hazarded but on the most pressing necessity, and for reasons of the
utmost importance.
When you are acting offensively, detachments ought never to be
employed, and even though you are in an open country, and have some places in your
possession, no more troops are to be spared than are barely sufficient to secure your
convoys.
Whenever war in made in Bohemia or Moravia, necessity requires that troops be sent out
to insure the arrival of provisions. Encampments must be formed on the chain of mountains
which the convoys are obliged to pass, and remain there till you have collected provisions
for some months, and are possessed of some strong place in the enemy's country that with
serve as a depot.
Whilst these troops are absent on detachments, you are to occupy advantageous camps,
and wait for their return.
The advanced guard is not reckoned as a detachment, because it should ever be near the
army, and not ventured on any account too near the enemy.
It sometimes happens, that when we are acting on the defensive, we are forced to make
detachments. Those which I had in Upper Silesia were in perfect safety by confining
themselves, as I have already observed, to the neighborhood of fortified places.
Officers who have the command of detachments, should be men of prudence and resolution,
for though they receive general instructions from their chief, it remains
for themselves to consult on the propriety of advancing or retreating, as occasion
may require.
When the force of the opponents is too strong, they should fall back, but on the other
hand, they should well know how to take advantage, if the superiority happen to be on
their own sides.
If the enemy approach by night, they will sometimes retire, and whilst they are
supposed to be put to flight, return briskly to the charge and defeat them.
No regard whatever is to be paid to the light troops.
The first thing to be attended to by an officer who commands a detachment, is his own
safety, and when that is secured, he is at liberty to form schemes against the enemy. To
ensure rest to himself, he must keep his adversary constantly awake, by continually
contriving plans against him, and if he succeed in two or three instances, the enemy will
be obliged to keep on the defensive.
If these detachments be near the army, they will establish a communication with it by
means of some town or neighboring wood.
In a war of defence, we are naturally induced to make detachments. Generals of
little experience are anxious to preserve every thing, whilst the man of intelligence and
enterprise regards only the grand point, in hopes of being able to strike some great
stroke, and suffers patiently a small evil that may secure him against one of more
material consequence.
The army of the enemy should be the chief object of our attention, it's designs must be
discovered, and opposed as vigorously as possible. In the year 1745 we abandoned Upper
Silesia to the ravages of the Hungarians, that we might be better enabled to thwart the
intentions of Prince Charles of Lorraine, and we made no detachments until we had defeated
his army. When that was done, General Nassau in fifteen days cleared the whole of Upper
Silesia of the Hungarians.
It is a custom with some generals to detach troops when they are about to make an
attack, to take the enemy in the rear during the action, but much danger attends a
movement of this kind, as the detachments generally lose their road, and arrive either too
early or too late. The detachment which Charles XII. sent out on the evening before the
battle of Pultawa lost it's way, and was the cause of the army's being beaten. Prince
Eugene's design of surprising Cremona failed also from the too late arrival of the
detachment of the Prince of Vaudemont, which was intended to attack the gate of Po.
Detachments should never take place on the day of battle, unless it be in the manner of
Turenne near Colmar, where he presented his first line to the army of the Elector
Frederick William, whilst the second line passing through defiles attacked him in flank
and routed him. Or we may copy the example of the Marshal de Luxembourg at the battle of
Fleury, in the year 1690, who posted a body of infantry in some high corn on the Prince of
Waldeck's flank, and by that manoeuvre gained the battle.
After a victory, but never till then, troops may be detached for the protection of
convoys, but even in this case they should not proceed a greater length than half a league
from the army.
I shall conclude this article by saying, that detachments which weaken the army one
half, or even a third part, are excessively dangerous, and strongly to be disapproved.
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