We are egregiously mistaking, if we suppose that the mere movement of an army will oblige
the enemy also to put himself in motion. This is to be effected not simply by moving, but
by the manner in which it is conducted. --An intelligent enemy will not be induced to stir
on account of any specious manoeuvres which you may think proper to practise: settled
positions must be taken up that will oblige him to reflect, and reduce him to the
necessity of decamping. For this reason we should be well informed of the nature of the
country, the abilities of the general to whom we are opposed, the situation of his
magazines, the towns that are most convenient to him, and those from which he draws his
forage, and when these various circumstances are well combined together, the plan is to be
formed and maturely digested.
That general who has the most fertile imagination, and attempts the most frequently to
distress his enemy, will eventually rival his antagonist in glory.
He who at the opening of a campaign is the most alert in the assembling his troops, and
marches forward to attack a town or occupy a post, will oblige his adversary to be
regulated by his motions, and remain on the defensive.
You must always be possessed of very good reasons for wishing to oblige the enemy to
move during a campaign: whether with a view of taking a town near where he is encamped,
driving him to a barren country where he will hardly be able to exist, or with the hope of
bringing on an engagement which will prove of material advantage. Induced by reasons of
this nature, you set about arranging your plan, taking care that the marches which you are
to make, and the camps which you are to occupy, do not lead you into greater
inconveniencies than the enemy will suffer, by drawing you away from your depot, which may
be in a place but badly fortified, and liable to be plundered by the light troops during
your absence; by taking up a position where you may be cut off from all communications
with your own country, or by occupying a situation which you will soon be obliged to
abandon for want of subsistence.
After serious deliberation on these objects, and after having calculated the chances of
enterprise on the part of the enemy, your plan is to be arranged, either for the purpose
of encamping on one of his flanks, approaching the provinces whence he draws his
subsistence, cutting him off from his capitol, threatening his depots, or
in short, taking up any position by which you deprive him of his provisions.
To give an instance with which the greatest part of my officers are well acquainted-I
had formed a plan by which I had reason to hope that I should oblige Prince Charles of
Lorraine to abandon Konigingraetz and Pardubitz in the year 1745.
When we quitted the camp at Dubletz, we ought to have gone to the left, passed along by
the country of Glatz, and marched near Hohenmauth. By this manoeuvre we should have forced
the Austrians, whose magazines were at Teutschbrod, and whose provisions were, for the
most part, drawn from Moravia, to have marched to Landscron, leaving to us Konigingraetz
and Pardubitz. The Saxons, being cut off from their home, would have been obliged to quit
the Austrians, in order to cover their own country.
What prevented my making this manoeuvre at that period was, that I should have profited
nothing if I had gained Koenigingraetz, as I must have sent detachments to the support of
the Prince of Anhalt, in case that the Saxons had returned home. Besides this
circumstance, the magazines at Glatz were not equal to the subsistence of my army during
the whole of the campaign.
The diversions that are made by detaching troops, will also sometimes oblige the enemy
to decamp, for generally speaking, every kind of enterprise that comes on him unawares
will have the effect of deranging him, and obliging him to quit his position.
Of such nature are the passing of mountains which the enemy deems impassible, and the
crossing of rivers without his knowledge.
Sufficient information is to be gained on this head by reading the campaign of Prince
Eugene in the year 1701. The confusion of the French army when it was surprised by Prince
Charles of Lorraine; who had crossed the Rhine, is a matter sufficiently well understood.
I shall conclude by saying, that the execution of enterprises of this nature should
always correspond with the design, and as long as the general's dispositions are wise and
founded on solid principles, so long will he have it in his power to give the law to his
enemy, and oblige him to keep on the defensive.
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