Nicholas BellCenturion
Posts : 91
Joined: 17 MAY 2005
Location: US, Alaska
Status : Offline | This thread reminded me of the campaign add-on "Kampfgruppe Peiper: 1943" Campaign for HPS Simulations "Tigers on
the Prowl II" on this battle I did for HPS Tigers on the Prowl back in 1997. I thought I would share the historical description for those interested. Sorry about the low-res images, but these are from 15 years ago. I think map 7 and 9 are especially interesting as they show the specific route used by Peiper. Whenever he ran into something he would back up and go around it. If you look at detailed maps of the Ardennes Offensive, it is easy to discern he was still attempting to use these tactics, but was thwarted by terrain and blown bridges.
The following sources provided information used in this campaign game. (Sure wish Glantz had been publishing back then)
"A Bold Stroke: Kiev 1943" by Jack Radey, Spearhead Games, Springfield,
Virginia, 1996.
"The Leibstandarte III" by Rudolf Lehmann, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1990. (the primary source for this campaign)
"Lost Victories" by Erich von Manstein, Presidio Press, Novato,
California, 1982
"Panzer Battles" by F.W. von Mellenthin, Ballatine Books, New York, 1971.
"Panzer Truppen" edited by Thomas Jentz, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen,
Pennsylvania, 1996.
"The Road to Berlin" by John Erickson, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado,
1983.
"Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in East" by Earl F. Ziemke and
Magna E. Bauer, Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army,
Washington, D.C. 1968.
Zhitomir Oblast, 1:200,000 Topographic Map, published by the Government of
Ukraine, 1992. Datum 1970-1992.
The following brief summary provides a outline for LSSAH's participation
in the German counterattacks west of Kiev. For more details please consider
the sources listed in the bibliography in the README.C10 file. MAP #
corresponds to the MAP#.JPG file included on the disk. On the topographic
maps, the underlined number numeral indicates the battle location for
the corresponding campaign engagement.
On November 3, 1943, the Soviet 1st Ukrainian Front smashed German defenses
and broke out of the Lyutezh Bridgehead north of Kiev. Sweeping aside weak
German forces, the Russians captured Kiev and the important railroad center
of Fastov on November 7th. Continuing their drive west and southwest,
Russian tanks took Zhitomir on the 11th and Korosten on the 17th. (MAP 1)
The Soviet attack had driven a wedge between Army Groups Center and South,
and threatened the entire southern wing of the German front with encircle-
ment. Fortunately for the Germans, reserves were on hand. 1SS Panzer,
1st Panzer, and 25th Panzer Divisions were all enroute to deal with another
critical situation near Kirovograd in the Dneiper River bend. These
were diverted north, but each division arrived piecemeal because of limited
railroad capacity and terrible road conditions due to a late muddy season.
The green 25th Panzer Division was thrown against the Russian onslaught,
ordered to retake Fastov without the benefit of it's Panzer Regiment which
was still in Kirovograd. The division was overrun and nearly destroyed by
the experienced Russian tankers in their T-34's.
The 1SS LSSAH Panzer arrived by train directly from northern Italy. Its units
had not been combat loaded (the division was to have gone first to Germany
for further reequipping) and had difficulty assembling. Most units were
unloaded farther west in Berdichev when the Russians overran the planned
point of unloading. Some units, including the III. (SPW)/SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment 2, were shuttled farther south.
From November 10th to the 14th LSSAH fought it's way north to the designated
departure line for the planned counterattack to retake Kiev. Fighting was
not severe, as the Russians pulled back their overextended forces, but LSSAH
took substantial losses.
For the attack, General Manstein (commanding Army Group South) gathered the
following divisions under the command of the 48th Panzer Korps
(General Balck) of the 4th Panzer Army (General Raus): LSSAH Pz, Das Reich Pz,
1 Pz, 7th Panzer, 19 Pz, 25th Pz, and 68th Infantry Division. The goal was
to recapture Kiev, but Raus felt it was too dangerous to attack the base of
the Russian salient closer to the Dneiper River, and instead opted for a
more conservative attack which would attack closer to the southwestern tip
of the salient. Zhitomir and Brussilov were to be the initial objectives.
As impressive as the 48th Pz Korps looked on paper, it's real strength was
much less because most units were far below strength. Only LSSAH and 1st
Panzer were anywhere near authorized strength. On November 16th (the day
after the main counterattack began) 1st Panzer had 171 panzers (95 Pz IV
and 76 Panthers, plus 7 FlammPz) and LSSAH had 137 panzers (they had arrived
in Russia with 227 - 95 Pz IV, 96 Panthers, 27 Tigers, and 9 command tanks).
The other divisions (Reich, 7th, 19th and 25th) were not much more than
regimental kampfgruppen by this time with anything from a couple dozen
panzers on a good day to five or less on a bad day (depending on the
output from the repair shops). Note that these figures do not include
Sturmgeschuetzen which would add some to the German strength (LSSAH had a
StG Abt with about 45 StG III). 509th Heavy Pz Battalion with 39 Tigers
(daily operational strength averaging 20-25) was also employed in the attack.
1st Ukrainian Front supposedly had about 675 tanks and assault guns in early
November, but they had also received reinforcements.
The first phase of the offensive began on November 15th. By the 18th,
Zhitomir had been retaken by the 1st and 7th Pz Divisions. Brussilov was
the initial objective of LSSAH, but it was unable to take it and suffered
severe losses while fighting the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. The division
fought in three separate elements without mutual support. Each panzer-
grenadier regiment had one panzer battalion attached (SS PzGr Regt 1 also
had the StuG battalion attached) while the Aufklaerungs battalion was
reinforced with the Tiger company and engineers. SS PzGr Regt 1 went around
Brussilov on the west side and got itself encircled and subjected to
many damaging Russian attacks until rescued by the 1st Panzer Division.
SS PzGr 2 was repulsed with heavy losses after an unimaginative frontal
assault on the south side of Brussilov. The Aufklaruengs battalion was
unable to protect the right flank of SS PzGr Regt 2 because of constant
Russian attacks. Eventually some sense of tactical sanity prevailed and
LSSAH was concentrated on the east of Russian pocket centered around
Brussilov.
On November 20th, Obersturmfuehrer Schoenberger, commander of SS Pz Regt 1
was killed while in the SS PzGr Regt 1's pocket in Kotscherovo. Command
of the Panzer Regiment passed to Sturmbannfuehrer Peiper, the audacious
leader of the III.(SPW)/SS PzGr Regt 2. Command of the SPW battalion fell
on Hauptsturmfuehrer Guhl, which was moving north into the combat zone
from railheads in the south.
Heavy fighting on the eastern side of the Brussilov pocket broke out on
November 22, while the SPW battalion moved north into the corridor. On
the 23rd, Kampfgruppe Peiper, consisting of SS Panzer Regiment 1 and
III (SPW)/ SS PzGr Regt 2 captured several villages northeast of Brussilov.
1st and 19th Panzer Divisions captured Brussilov and began clearing out the
pocket. Late in the evening KG Peiper jumped the Sdvish River and captured
Lasarovka. The bridge needed to be strengthened to support the movement of
large numbers of vehicles, so the 2d Company, Panzer-Pioneer Battalion 1 was
moved up. Korps ordered LSSAH to continue the attack to the northeast. The
division commander protested, making it clear that Soviet superiority would
make a breakthrough impossible. The attack would proceed.
1. STARIZKAJA 24 November 1943 (look for #1 on right edge)
By late morning the bridge was reinforced and the Kampfgruppe moved into
the bridgehead. The attack began at 12:30, but quickly ran into a strong
PAK front on the edge of Starizkaja and was counterattacked by Russian tanks.
The Germans forced their way into Starizkaja, but were unable to continue.
Russian defenses on hill 185 were too strong. Plans were made to attack
Hill 185 on the night of November 25th (perhaps indicating that losses
were heavy and that time for repair and rest was necessary), but this
plan was canceled. Korps acknowledged that any further attacks would not
succeed. KG Peiper was relieved by elements of SS PzGr 1 on the afternoon
of the 25th.
This final attack ended the initial phase of 48th Panzer Korps attempt to
retake Kiev. Strong Russian forces were massing on the Korps left flank,
threatening to drive south and cut off the salient formed by the Korp's
drive to the northeast. LSSAH was directed to pull out of the line
(1st Panzer Division extended its front to cover the hole) and move north
to attack this enemy concentration south of Radomyshyl. The move was made
on the 26th and the attack began at 0600 on the 27th.
The terrain south of Radomyshyl was broken with heavy woods, so the attack
lead by the two Panzergrenadier regiments, with KG Peiper in reserve waiting
for a weak point to be found and exploited. With heavy artillery support
the Panzergrenadier regiments pushed north. In the middle of the afternoon
the SPW was sent forward and occupied an important intersection with Russian
resistance. No reason is given, but the battalion was pulled back.
The next day the attack continued, and again the SPW battalion was sent off
ahead of the main body. When Russians moved out of the woods behind it,
threatening the battalion's rear, it was pulled back once again. Meanwhile
the panzers were moving parallel to the north, clearing large minefields which
obviously were not covered by fire. Russian counterattacks against other
sectors of LSSAH front began building in the late afternoon. The panzers
captured the edge buildings of the village of Gradov. 2d Fallshirmjaeger
Division was ordered to clear the woods behind LSSAH and take over its
front the following day.
2. TOLSTOYE 29 November 1943 (#2 center top_
The SPW battalion was given the task of clearing the woods west of Tolstoye
where the Russians seemed to be concentrating for another attack into the LSSAH
flank. The attack began at 0530 and ran headlong into a Russian attack. Both
sides pulled back. Meanwhile, Peiper captured the rest of Gardov and had
sent the 1st Battalion of SS Pz Regt 1 to assist the III (SPW)/2. This
time the attack was carried through and the KG destroyed an estimated two
battalions of infantry.
The front was quiet for the next two days and the relief of LSSAH by the
2d Fallshirmjaeger Division was completed on December 1st.
A Wehrmacht report claimed that during the period November 15-30, the
48th Panzer Korps killed 20,000 Russians, captured 4800, and destroyed
603 tanks and 1305 artillery pieces. Nevertheless, the German attack had
not achieved its goal of retaking Kiev, nor were the Soviet plans much
hindered, as they continued to pour forces into the area farther west.
The 60th Army was preparing to launch an attack into the rear of the 48th
Panzer Korps and recapturing Zhitomir. The Germans were aware of this
buildup and planned a surprise attack by pulling the 48th Pz Korps out the
the east and moving it to the northwest of Zhitomir, enabling it to hit
the Russians in the flank. No reconnaissance was performed as to not tip off
the Russian command. The supply trains of LSSAH were moved in the open to the
south as a deception. By December 5, 1943 the 48th Pz Korps had its attack
formations in place facing east, with the 7th and 1st Panzer on the left
flank of LSSAH.
LSSAH Operational Status on December 4th was:
Operational Under Repair Total
Pz IV 30 44 74
Panther 28 52 80
Tiger 4 21 25
Pz III Cmd 4 1 5
StG III 12 34 46
Marder 9 9
Total 87 152 239
These figures speak loudly for the excellent German battlefield recovery and
at the same time shows the abysmal repair capability. While the maintenance
personnel could work wonders, their ability to repair large quantities of
vehicles was limited by personnel, equipment, and spare parts shortages.
Kampfgruppe Peiper was given the objective of Radomyshyl, with an intermediate
objective of Styrty. The attack began in the early morning hours of December
6th, 1943. Resistance was scattered and ineffective, although the commander
of the III (SPW)/2, Hauptsturmfuehrer Guhl was wounded. The KG captured
Pekarschtchina and Andreevka by 0645. The SS PzGr Regt 2 followed the
panzer attack policing up the surprised Russians.
This is Map 7 referenced below
3. STYRTY 6 December 1943 (MAP 7)
Around 1030 KG Peiper captured Styrty after a fight with the first organized
Russian defenses encountered that day. The KG overcame the resistance and
continued its march to the east, driving a deep wedge into the Russian
forces. Enemy forces to the south attempted to counterattack the panzer-
grenadiers of the 1st and 2d PzGr Regiments which were echeloned on the
right flank of KG Peiper. Peiper continued moving east and captured Torchin
around 1900. Armored patrols indicated that the next town on the march route,
Tschaikovka, was heavy defended.
4. TSCHAIKOVKA 7 December 1943 (MAP 7)
SS PzGr Regt 2 was ordered to take Tschaikovka, but only the II/2 was on hand,
the I/2 being delayed for unknown reasons. Division ordered KG Peiper to
assist II/2 take the town. The attack which began around 1230 ran into heavy
defense fire from the hills on the northwest side of the town and a strong
Russian PAK front on south side. The attack was blunted, and division ordered
Peiper to move around the town on the north side. SS PzGr Regt 2 was to
encircle and take the town. This attack began in the evening with the
arrival of I/2 and succeeded. It appears that the Russians must have pulled
out after being outflanked by KG Peiper, for it seems unlikely that two
motorized infantry battalions could capture Tschaikovka by themselves when
the heavy armored KG Peiper could not.
KG Peiper moved around the north side of Tschaikovka and then proceeded
driving to the east-southeast until it ran into heavy anti-tank fire
south of Sabolot at 2115.
5. SABOLOT 8 December 1943 (MAP 7)
Peiper pulled his KG back west in night and moved around Sabolot to the
north, taking the village of Chodory at 0345. The attack on Sabolot began
at 0800 and the enemy forces were destroyed. By 1015 Peiper reported the
town firmly in hand. However, he needed supplies, and these had to wait
while SS PzGr Regt 2 followed up and cleared a wider corridor. The KG
remained idle for the remainder of the day. In the meantime, SS PzGr Regt 1
continued to push east in heavy fighting in their attempt to keep up with
KG Peiper and protect its right flank.
The next day PzGr 1 attacked toward Radomyshyl and ran into strong Russian
defenses. Division called off the attack and ordered all elements of the
division to concentrate and attack Mezhirischka. This town was the northern
bulwark of the remaining Russian forces forming a bridgehead on the west side
of the Teterev River. Once Mezhirischka was taken, LSSAH could drive south
into the flank of the bridgehead and pocket the Russian units around
Radomyshyl. The redeployment took most of the day.
6. MEZHIRISCHKA 9 December 1943 (MAP 7)
Following a heavy artillery bombardment, the attack began around 1800. KG
Peiper had a narrow sector and was given the southern half of Mezhirischka
as an objective. SS PzGr 2 was operating closely on its left flank and would
take the northern part of the town. The attack made good progress although
Russian defenses were strong. By 2000 the enemy had been cleared from the
town and minor counterattacks repulsed.
At the end of day LSSAH had the following:
Operational Under Repair Total Total 4 Dec
Pz IV 8 62 70 74
Panther 6 70 76 80
Tiger 4 20 24 25
Pz III Cmd 2 4 6 5
StG III 8 38 46 46
Marder 7 7 9
Total 35 194 229 239
The next day LSSAH began its attack south from Mezhirischka toward Vel. Racha.
The execution of the attack was bungled, and for reasons not mentioned, the
III(SPW)/2, SS Panzer Aufklaerungs Battalion 1, I and II/2 began the attack
without Panzer support, which arrived as the attack was suspended. Anti-tank
fire persuaded the Panzer force not to proceed. When the Russians began
attacking Mezhirischka again (in the rear of the assault force) the division
commander called everything off. He "declared himself dissatisfied" with the
actions of the division that day.
To prevent a repeat failure, LSSAH would attack Vel. Racha from the flank
by attacking through the neighboring Russian strongpoint at Krasnoborki.
LSSAH would be assisted by elements of the 1st Panzer. LSSAH Sturmgeschuetze-
abteilung would reinforce the SS PzGr 2's attack on the northern part of
Krasnoborki (the StG had been supporting SS PzGr 1 throughout the attack),
while the 1st Panzer attacked from the west. KG Peiper would move through
the very eastern part of the town and assault Hill 170 and Vel. Racha from
the flank and rear.
7. VEL. RACHA 12 December 1943 (MAP 7)
The attack began at noon after a 10 minute concentrated barrage. All forces
made good progress. KG Peiper made the turn southeast while SS PzGr Regt 2
broke into Krasnoborki. By 1345 Hill 170 had been taken and 21 anti-tank
guns destroyed and advanced toward Vel. Racha. Russian tanks were encountered
(no mention of losses on either side). By 1650 Vel. Racha was in German hands
and an evening Russian counterattack to retake the town was repulsed. The
Germans advanced farther east to Chudin, a small village on the banks of the
Teterev River.
The Soviet forces around Radomyshyl were now in a loosely held pocket and
began attempting to escape to the east through the gap south of Vel. Racha.
All through December 13th units of LSSAH beat off Russian escape attempts
as 1st Panzer Division squeezed the pocket. All during the day, the Russian
Air Force aided their forces by launching constant air attacks throughout the
Korps sector.
German intelligence deduced that the Russians were building up their forces
in the Iskra and Teterev River triangle, in order to protect the railline
which ran west through the area to their forces near Korosten. LSSAH was
ordered to attack north to eliminate these forces and severe the railline.
LSSAH was relieved by infantry forces and turned its direction of attack
180 degrees.
8. ISKRA 14 December 1943 (MAP 7)
KG Peiper and SS PzGr Regt 1 were given ambitious objectives. Their initial
objective was to capture Irscha via Iskra and Vyrva (Vyrva and Irscha are off
the lower right corner of the battle map). KG Peiper would lead the attack
and SS PzGr Regt 1 would follow. SS PzGr 2 would be attack up the Teterev
River on the KG's right flank. Farther to the west, on the left flank
was 1st Panzer Division. Note that the SS PzGr Regt 1 forces are not included
in the battle scenario. There is neither enough room in the unit roster to
include them, nor did they play any part in KG Peiper's actions. There also
appears to be some confusion in Lehmann's action of this action which may be
the result of bad battle reports (not uncommon) or faulty maps (also not
unheard of). In any case, the attack started at 1130 and by 1225 Iskra had
been taken. KG Peiper continue moving to toward Irscha and pulled back when
it ran into resistance. The panzers when followed the streambed toward
Federovka. In the clearings they ran engaged Russian tanks. Although not
clearly stated, KG Peiper must have reached Federovka, because late in the
afternoon the adjutant of the SS Pz Regt 1 reported that the bridge at
Federovka was the only bridge across the river (supposedly PzGr 1 was pushing
on Vyrva and Irscha, although I find this difficult to believe since the
unit would have had to eliminated the Russian forces that KG Peiper turned
away from!). 1st Panzer Division was pushing on Federovka from the southwest,
but before the two units could link in that town, Korps called off the attack.
LSSAH pulled out on December 15th. The Panzer Aufklaerungs Abteilung was
involved in some heavy fighting. Russian attacks on the 68th Infantry
Division forced that unit back and Vel. Racha and Krasnoborki were lost.
The Aufklaerungs Abteilung, with assistance from SS PzGr Regt 2 and the StG
battalion retook Krasnoborki. In a repeat performance of KG Peiper's attack
on the 12th, the Aufklaerungs Abteilung took Hill 170 and then recaptured
Vel. Racha! (the unit's commander, Sturmbannfuehrer Knittel won the Knights
Cross for his leadership in this attack)
Russian forces were gathering east of Korosten using the railline LSSAH failed
to cut on the 14th. 4th Panzer Armee ordered 48th Panzer Korps to destroy
these forces northwest of Malin. The 1st Panzer and LSSAH were moved west
to positions southeast of Korosten. 7th Panzer Division moved into the
area south of the Iskra River and Malin.
The attack plan called for LSSAH to advance north following a very heavy
artillery barrage. They were to bypass Melini to the west and then make
a 135 degree turn to the southeast and attack along the parallel main road
a railline between Kiev and Korosten, encircling the Russian forces in the
Melini-Chepovichi area when the 7th Panzer moved north.
At 1005 the attack began, delayed by several hours because of road conditions.
LSSAH reported on hand having 33 Pz IV, 12 Panthers, 7 Tigers, 18 StG, and
12 Marder. The Russians were surprised and offered no organized resistance,
although the advance was slow because of heavy woods.
9. BALJARKA 19 December 1943 (MAP 9)
By 1430 KG Peiper had made its turn to the southeast after advancing a little
farther north than the main Kiev-Korosten road. At 1455 the KG reported
heavy combat with infantry and tanks in the southeastern part of Stremigorod.
Peiper then turned his force south and captured Baljarka, claiming 2 T-34
destroyed.
The attack moved on but was halted when a strong PAK front was discovered in
Permoga. SS PzGr Regt 1 was fighting to clear KG Peiper's left flank while
SS PzGr Regt 2 moved up against Permoga. 1st Panzer moved up and to the
left rear of LSSAH. In the evening KG Peiper pulled behind the lines of
SS PzGr 2.
10. CHEPOVICHI STATION 20 December 1943 (MAP 9 see above)
At 1330 KG Peiper, reinforced by KG Bradel of the 1st Panzer Division moved
southeast along the main road and railline toward Chepovichi Station (located
several kilometers north of Chepovichi proper). Heavy fighting ensued, and
the northern half of the station town was taken. The southern part of the
station was either not taken or was reoccupied by the Russians when KG Peiper
was relieved by II./SS PzGr Regt 2. This unit had to fight to take this
area of Chepovichi Station.
At the end of the day LSSAH reported operational 9 Pz IV, 8 Panthers, and
3 Tigers. The commander of the 13th Heavy Panzer Company (Tiger), Hauptsturm-
fuehrer King was awarded with the Knight's Cross for this action.
On the 21st the Russian counterattacked Chepovichi Station, but were unable
make any inroads. KG Peiper apparently was out of the action, except for
6 "Panzers" which were attached to SS PzGr Regt 1 (use of "Panzer" usually
denotes Pz IV as Panthers and Tigers are usually named in the text, but there
is no definitive information in this case). The reinforced SS PzGr Regt 1
moved several kilometers down the railline to Ossefovka where they were
surrounded. In the fight, the six panzers destroyed 21 Russian tanks.
The force was eventually able to pull back to Chepovichi Station with one
panzer operational. Soviet forces were spotted moving toward Chepovichi from
the north, east, and south.
LSSAH launched an abortive frontal attack on Melini from the north on December
22d, after 1st Panzer Division relieved it at Chepovichi. It appears that
no panzers were involved in the attack - the Panzer Regiment was already
pulling out - and the operational strength actually rose. So the infantry
of the two Panzergrenadier regiments took the brunt of Russian counterattacks
from the east as the attack on Melini moved south. The 23d was a relatively
quiet day as the division prepared to pull back to behind the start lines
of the 19th. That evening, as the movement was made, Russian units
infiltrated Baljarka and were surrounded and destroyed by StG supported by
SS PzGr 1. The retreat was complete by the morning of the 24th. On the
25th, the Soviets launched a massive attack across the old Brussilov battle
fields. LSSAH was hurriedly sent to stem the tide. Within five days the
Russians had recaptured Zhitomir and all gains of the last five weeks.
This five week period had cost both sides heavily. The Germans claimed
to have destroyed hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces and antitank guns.
The German losses were heavy too. The infantry battalions in LSSAH had less
than 150 men apiece. Instead of 240 panzers authorized, LSSAH struggled to
keep 30-50 vehicles operational on a daily basis. And LSSAH was the most
powerful unit in the 48th Panzer Korps at the end of the battle. The Russians
could afford whatever losses they really took, and where able to continue
their offensive to reconquer the Ukraine. The Germans had no reserves, and
therefore no ability rest and rebuild their units. They could do nothing
but delay the Russian advance. LSSAH would be in constant defensive combat
for the next three months, without the luxury of staying in one place for
even a week (very important to the repair shops for maintaining panzer
strength). By the time LSSAH was pulled out to the west, it had the fighting
strength of a battalion.
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