Using Ron Dockal's Middle East Wars (MDE), I will be examining the 1973 Arab Israeli War, from both sides.  I will be utilizing the game to delve into the possiblities of whether the Egyptian's and Syrian's could have gained a total victory based on the historical actions of the Israeli High Command.  By playing the Israeli's using strictly historical actions and inactions, and also playing the Egyptian's/Syrian's based on what they COULD have done if presented with the same Israeli reaction's, should prove interesting.

The following optional rules are in effect: 1973 Arab SAM Advantage

The following self imposed rule is in effect: No units from either side may enter Jordan.

On 5 October, 1973, the satellite images of the Middle East presented a confusing picture to those in the US intelligence community.  On the west bank of the Suez Canal, Five Egyptian divisions (100,000 soldiers) over 1300 tanks, and 2000 artillery pieces were in tactical array along with rubber boats and bridging equipment.  Facing them on the Israeli side were about 500 men in the strong points of the "Bar Lev" line.  The Israeli's could see the massive forces on the opposite bank but it didn't cause them concern even though they only had 44 artillery pieces and 240 tanks in all of the Sinai.  On the Golan Heights, the disparity in forces was even greater. 5 Syrian divisions were out in the open, not under camoflage, and in full tactical array. The Israeli's were outnumbered 8-1 in tanks, and far greater in artillery and infantry.  The Syrian's had carved into the lava fields a complex secondary defensive line on their side of the "Purple Line", the UN ceasefire line that was drawn in purple on military maps. There were no secondary defensive positions on the Israeli side.

The Israeli's were still basking in the victories of the 6 Day War in 1967. To them, the Arab armies were never going to be a serious threat. The way in which the Arabs conducted themselves on the battlefield during that war, retreating, surrendering, their Air Forces destroyed on the ground, would be the sterotype the Israeli High Command would view the Arab military and its leaders. As the sun set, the people of Israel were starting Yom Kippur, preparing for this holiest of days, feeling more secure than ever. They were wrong.

Syrian Front 5 October

Sinai Front (North of the Great Bitter Lake)

South of the Great Bitter Lake

6 Oct 1973

Up until the very early hours of 6 Oct, the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence (Aman) did not believe Egypt or Syria would attack.  Only a few lower level analysts had made the obvious connection days earlier, but they were ignored by their superiors. A major portion of the Israeli strategy was already comprimised as it was assumed Aman would give the IDF at least 48hrs warning of an attack, thus allowing the mobilization of the Israeli reserves.

Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Israeli Chief of Staff General David Elazar met at 8:05am, only six hours before the war would begin. Dayan still believed war was not a certainty, but Elazar knew better and requested that the Air Force conduct preemptive strikes against enemy airfields at 12 noon, and against the Sam 6 missile batteries on the Golan Heights at 3pm. Here were two of Israel's greatest warriors asking a 75 year old grandmother permission to wage war. Meir, to her credit, knew that if Israel struck first, no one would come to her aid. Hours later she would be proven right when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told her the United States hands would be tied if Israel attacked first.  She denied Elazar permission for a preemptive strike, but did give permission to begin the mobilization of the reserves.

At 2pm the war began with planes from both Egypt and Syria attacking the rear areas of the Israeli Army on two fronts.

Egyptian Special Forces cut the Coast Road.

"If the arrival of the remainder Ben Gal's 7th Armored Bde did not occur 10 days prior, the ratio of tanks on the Golan Heights would have been 18:1"

The Syrian attack against the Israeli line on the Golan Heights was not a thing of beauty,  it didn't have to be.  The three infantry divisions (Infantry only in name as they contained over 900 tanks, plus an independent armored brigade added to each) overrun the thin forward defenses.  Historically, the southern portion of the Israeli defenses on the Golan collapsed. Here, the southern position collapses due to the inclusion of the Iraqi 3rd Armored Division on the 1st day of the war. This deep penetration by the Iraqi 6th Ar Bde gives the Syrian 5th Mech Div more options:  ie.. to follow the Iraqi's or to roll up the southern flank of the Israeli line. 

"By 5:30pm the final assault wave had crossed and some 32,000 Egyptian soldiers were on the east bank of the canal."

In the north Sinai, mechanized elements of the Egyptian 15th Ar Div. link up with the Special Forces that cut the Coastal Road.

On the Golan, Ben Gal's 7th Ar Bde is able to hold the northern portion of the Israeli line, but in the south, Barak's 188th Ar Bde disintegrates in front of the massive Syrian attack and penetration. Throughout the first night, Israeli and Syrian units would become intermingled on the southern Golan as the fighting becomes confused.  Both sides higher commands do not believe the reports of the successes and failures of one another.

The commander of the Southern (Sinai) front, Gen Gonen, had not moved from his rear Hq's and does not comprehend the severity of the situation and orders Gen Mendler, Commander of the 252nd (Sinai) Ar Div to get his forces to the canal.  Mendler also does not know how bad the situation really is and sends his 3 armored brigades, Shomron's 401st in the south, Reshev's 14th in the center, and Amir's 460th in the north, piecemeal into the Egyptian forces.

Oct 6th,1973 Recap: (Historical)  At the end of the first day of fighting, the Israeli High Command still did not grasp the severity of the situation on both fronts.  The Northern (Golan) front was in a shambles. Even though the 7th Ar Bde was able to hold its positions in the north, they had still taken serious losses and they knew the Syrian's were going to attack again.  The 188th Ar Bde faired even worse in the south.  The Syrian's simply overran the Israeli positions by shear weight of numbers.  Most alarming was the loss of a large number of Officers at the Company and Battalion levels and the lack of a defined front line.  The only thing holding the Syrian's back were the actions of small groups of tanks,  most famously "Task Force Zwicka".

(Game) The advancement of the Iraqi 6th Ar Bde signifies the biggest deviation from the historical. The first night, there were no appreciable Israeli forces between the Syrian's and the Jordan River south of El Al, but they stopped.  The movement of the 1st Inf (Golani) Bde to block the advance, and the repositioning of elements of the 188th Ar Bde mirrors the confusion on the battlefield.

The Southern (Sinai) front was no better.  The Egyptian's had conducted the crossing of the Canal in excellent fashion and were pouring tanks and mechanized forces across the waterway all night long. The Israeli's attempted to relieve the strongpoints of the Bar Lev line by sending in their armor piecemeal and paid the price.

In the game, the linkup of the Mechanized forces with the Special Forces that had cut the coastal road was unhistorical as no Egyptian forces ventured forward of the SAM umbrella that covered the forces on the east bank of the canal..

7 October, 1973:  The code name for the Israeli response to an Arab attack across the Suez Canel and on the Golan Heights was "Dovecote".  It s basic premise was that Israeli Military Intelligence (AMAN) would give the High Command at least 48hrs notice of an impending attack thus allowing Israel's reserves to be called up and deployed.  If that time line was even less than 48hrs, the Israeli disdain for the Arab soldier led them to believe that between the IAF and the on hand IDF forces (the 252nd Ar (Sinai) Division in the south and the 36th Ar Division in the north would be able to hold the line long enough.  The lethality of the SAM 6 mobile Ground to Air missile system was a shock to the IAF and the world. The losses the IAF incurred on the second day were not sustainable and the reserves were at least a day away on the southern front.

7 October, 1973:  As dawn broke on the Golan Heights, the Syrian Army reinforces their success in the south by totally committing the Iraqi 3rd Ar and Syrian 5th Inf Div's. The attacks of these two divisions break the disjointed Israeli defense and bring the lead Iraqi armored brigades to the Jordan River in strength. Although the Jordanian's had communicated to the Israeli's prior to the outbreak of hostilities their intention of not attacking Israel directly, the success of the Syrian's along their northern border has put heavy pressure on them to join the attack.  The IDF is faced with an Arab force about to enter Israel that could drive south to Bet Shean securing Jordan's border, thus giving them no reason not to join the attack, or north to Tiberias, threatening the rear of the Israeli position, north of the Sea of Galilee.

In the northern Golan, the Syrian 7th Inf decides to hold onto their gains as the 1st Ar and 9th Inf Divisions slam into the Israeli's spliting the 7th and 188th Ar Bde's defensive line apart and threatening to seal off the northern Israeli position. 

Another ominous sign for Israel is the movement west from Suweida, of four independent brigades and the initial movement of Syria's strategic reserve, the 3rd Ar Division.

"Anwar Sadat's objective from the start was not to reclaim the Sinai, but to secure a foothold on the east bank of the Suez Canal for two reasons: 1) To have something substantial to take to the bargining table when the inevitable ceasefire would be demanded by the UN, and 2) To restore the honor of the Eygptian military and her people."

All along the Suez Canal, the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian Armies continue to consolidate their positions and await the counterattack of the IDF armored forces.

"85 percent of the reserves arrived within the alloted time. Most would arrived in half that time"

The two reserve divisions that were assigned to Southern Command were commanded by generals whiose rich military careers were supposed to be behind them.  Avraham "Bren" Adan and his 162nd Ar "Ugda" was assigned the northern canal sector and approached the front using the coastal road.  Ariel Sharon's 143rd Ar Ugda was assigned the central sector and approached through the heart of the Sinai.  Adan's division was caught up in traffic jams along the coast while Sharon's arrived intact.

When both generals arrived at the front,  they found their respective situations totally different than what they were briefed  upon. General Mendler, whose 252nd Ar Ugda was holding the line up to that point briefed Sharon, he was haggard and exhausted.  He would be replaced the next day by General Magen after losing his life in an artillery barrage. Sharon insisted that a two divisional attack immediately before the Egyptian's secured the bridgeheads would succeed.  He was overridden by General Elazar, the Chief of Staff and Moshe Dayan.  At that point in the war on the Sinai, they were right, Sharon was wrong, but that didn't stop him from probing.....

As the lead Brigades of General Laner's 240th Ar Ugda arrives on the Golan, they are sent to reienforced the hard pressed center of General Eitan's 36th Mech Ugda. The loss of the southern Golan forces General Hofi to send the 31st Airborne Bde, which is part of Eitan's 36th Ugda to block the Jordan river crossings south of the Sea of Galilee.

7 October, 1973 Recap (Historical)...On the Golan Heights, the Syrian's were besieging the major crossroad town of Nafakh, which if captured, would provide them access to the rear of Ben Gal's 7th Ar Bde, the only unit on the Golan to hold their positions through two days of battle. Even with the arrival of lead elements of Laner's Ugda, the situation on the Golan was critical. After being briefed by Gen Hofi, the Cdr of Northern Command, Moshe Dayan, sat on the side of a road and wept.

Enter Moussa Peled.. the Commander of the 146th Ar Ugda..............

Game Recap:  With the 240th Ugda reinforcing the center of the Israeli line, the Syrian's decide to concentrate on continuing their advance in the south.  Here, the battle will be decided. The only way the Syrian's can secure the flank/rear of the 3rd Iraqi and 5th Syrian divisions as they attack across the Jordan river is to advance north towards Tiberias and force the Israeli's to withdraw from the northern Golan to prevent from being cut off.

Sinai (Historical)....The Egyptian's continue to consolidate their bridgeheads across the Suez Canal but do not venture out from under the umbrella of the mobile SAM sites.  By doing so, they protect the force from the IAF who have taken serious loses attempting to destroy the bridges the Eygptian's have erected across the Canal.

Game:  To this point, the Sinai front has remained fairly historical as the Eygptian's must get their armored and mechanized forces across the canal before any further advance can be undertaken. 

8 Oct, 1973:  Over the south Sea of Galilee, a massive air battle takes place as both the Israeli and Syrian air forces are committed to achieving their goals. The Syrian air force hits the defending elements of the 31st Airborne Bde as the Israeli air force, regardless of the losses they had already taken, are ordered to slow the advance of the Iraqi 3rd Ar Division. The IAF again takes horrendous losses in the operation, but they decimate the Iraqi ground forces....

Originally Posted By bootlegger267 (3 AUG 2012 6:57pm)

7 October, 1973:  As dawn broke on the Golan Heights, the Syrian Army reinforces their success in the south by totally committing the Iraqi 3rd Ar and Syrian 5th Inf Div's. The attacks of these two divisions break the disjointed Israeli defense and bring the lead Iraqi armored brigades to the Jordan River in strength. Although the Jordanian's had communicated to the Israeli's prior to the outbreak of hostilities their intention of not attacking Israel directly, the success of the Syrian's along their northern border has put heavy pressure on them to join the attack.  The IDF is faced with an Arab force about to enter Israel that could drive south to Bet Shean securing Jordan's border, thus giving them no reason not to join the attack, or north to Tiberias, threatening the rear of the Israeli position, north of the Sea of Galilee.

 

In the northern Golan, the Syrian 7th Inf decides to hold onto their gains as the 1st Ar and 9th Inf Divisions slam into the Israeli's spliting the 7th and 188th Ar Bde's defensive line apart and threatening to seal off the northern Israeli position. 

 

Another ominous sign for Israel is the movement west from Suweida, of four independent brigades and the initial movement of Syria's strategic reserve, the 3rd Ar Division.

 

 

 

 

 

I like how you pushed along the edge of the river and waterways, keeping them to secure your flanks.

8 Oct, 1973..."The world has seen that we are not stronger than the Egyptians. The aura, and the political and military advantage of it, being known that Israel is stronger than the Arabs and that it would beat them if they go to war, this has not been proven here"....Moshe Dayan's off the record comments to Israel's newspaper editors on 9 Oct.

With the offensive power of the 3rd Iraqi Ar Div broken, the  Syrain High Command decides to use the constricted terrain to their advantage. By securing their southern flank with the remnants of the Iraqi's and the newly arrived Morrocan Bde, they launched a four divisional attack against the Israeli line on the central Golan. The 5th Inf and 1st Ar divisions force the Israeli's to the West bank of the Jordan river while to their right the 7th and 9th Inf divisions push the southern elements of Ben-Gals 7th Ar Bde to the East bank of the river.

In the Egyptian 2nd Army sector, the 20th and 21 Ar Divisions begin to breakout and destroy an Armored Bn of the Israeli 14th Ar Bde.

The Egyptian 7th and 19th Inf Divisions breakout of their bridgeheads and strike for the Gidi and Mitla Passes, each destroying a Bn of the Israeli 401st Ar Bde.  There is now a 20 mile gap in the Israeli line ready to be exploited by the Egyptian 40th Ar Div.....

Sharon's 143rd Ugda can only reinforce the battered remains of Mendler's 252nd Ugda and form some type of defensive line as Adan's Division continues to arrive in the north Sinai.

On the Northern front,  the arrival of the first elements of Peled's 146th Ugda brings relief to the threat of a breakthrough by the Syrian's south of El Al.  Laner's 240th Ugda continues to reinforce the Eitan's 36th Ugda but the situation is still very much in doubt.

8 Oct, 1973 Recap (Historical)...Gen Gonen, the Southern Front Commander mis-interprets the orders of Gen Elazar and commences an uncoordinated counterattack by Adan's under-strength division and Sharon's 143rd Ugda. Adan's forces get bloodied by the Egyptian's who have been waiting for the attack.....

Sharon's forces are also shocked by the ferocious defense thrown up by the Egyptian's, but some elements of his division actually make it to the canal, but once Elazar hears that instead of just forming a defensive line until all the reserves arrive, that, yet again, his armored forces were thrust into battle unprepared, he personally tells Sharon to pull back or be relieved.  

On the Northern Front, Peled's lead Bde arrives north of El Al and finally brings some stability to the mess that the southern Golan had become. Eitan's 36th Ugda survived the day and his portion of the front was in firm Israeli control. 

8 Oct, 1973 Recap (Game)...Peled's 146th Ugda is still on the WEST bank of the Jordan river because the Syrian's did not stop north of El Al as they did historically. With the Syrian Army in firm control of the Golan Heights, and with the Egyptian's 3rd Army's advance towards the Mitla and Gidi passes, the Israeli situation is dire.  Note...the landing of the Egyptian Special Forces at El Arish simulates the horrible traffic jam that Adan's forces encountered trying to get to the front.

"There are no more reserves" .......Gen Tal speaking to members of the Israeli Cabinet on 9 Oct, the critical day for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. 

9 Oct, 1973...In the Sinai, the already weakened IAF sacrifices itself conducting Tactical Bombing missions against the Egyptian 3rd Army as it advances on the Gidi and Mitla Passes. To make up the shortage in aircraft available for the airstrikes, dual mission aircraft normally assigned Air Superiority missions are used leaving the ground forces without air cover. Knowing that they have seriously damaged the IAF and that they can not perform both missions, the Egyptian Air Force strikes the exposed ground units in and around the passes. Although the losses sustained by the IAF are critical, they do cripple the Egyptian 7th Infantry Division but the Egyptian's also cause serious damage to the units defending the passes.

The Israeli High Command, knowing it must take the initiative away from the Syrian's and slow their advance, orders the IAF to strike the Iraqi/Syrian position south of the Sea of Galilee in preparation for Gen Peled's counterattck towards El Al.  Again the IAF takes unacceptable losses..........

9 Oct 1973....The Egyptian 2nd Army, after 3 days of consoldation within its bridgehead on the east bank of the Suez Canal, breaksout, and in the process destroys what remained of the Israeli 460th Ar Bde. With the Israeli northern flank wide open, Sharon's rear areas are exposed and the main base at the crossroads town of Refifdim is threatened.

South of the Great Bitter Lake, the Egyptian 3rd Army also starts its breakout offensive and captures the Gidi Pass.  The Israeli's maintain control of the Mitla Pass to the south but the defensive position is untendable. The whole Israeli defensive position in the Sinai is now comprimised.

The Syrian High Command commits the 3rd Ar Division but not as an eploitation force, instead it heads south to bolster the position of the battered Iraqi's. By securing their left flank, they continue to push the Israeli defensive line back, this time by attacks along the right flank against Ben Gals 7th Bde.  For the first time though, one attack fails: the 5th Inf Divison along with the 1st Ar Division fails to reduce or move the bulge in the Syrian line along the shores of the Galilee. 

"it would take at least three days to transfer a Division from the Golan to the Sinai, and the Golan is the immediate threat to Israel." Golda Meir on commenting to her generals who were divided on where Israel should concentrate her forces on 9 Oct 1973.

9 Oct, 1973...Israel is facing a crisis on both fronts. On the Golan, the Syrian's continued pressure has brought the IDF to the breaking point and the thought of Syrian forces roaming the Galilee is unacceptable.  Peled's complete 146th Ugda is committed to the Golan Heights in the hope of reversing the stratigic situation.

With the breakout of the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian Armies, the IDF is forced to retreat, setting up a defensive line anchored on the main north/south road from Salmana to Refidim, and Refidim to Sadr el Hiltan.  The divisional boundary is the East/West road from the Chinese Farm to Refidim. The IDF must be able to absorb the next offensive blow from the Egyptian's to give time for the counter-blow to have any effect on the Golan front.  

Adan's 162nd Ugda is deployed with the remnants of Magen's 252dn Ugda in the north Sinai but must send the 35th AB Bde to reinforce Sharon's 143rd Ugda in the far south.  Adan keeps 2 armored brigades back from the line to act as a mobile reaction force to the next Egyptian move.

9 Oct, 1973 (Historical Recap).. This was the low point for Israel during the 1973 War.  The IDF was in disaray as the Syrian's on the Golan Heights still had the initiative and had pressured the IDF to the breaking point.  Only the effects of small Plt sized elements kept the Syrian's off balance as well as their own regimented command structure.  In the Sinai, the first Israeli counter-attack was a dismal failure as the disjointed attack by 2 understrength Divisions was uncoordinated and beaten back by the Egyptian's.  The one piece of good news was the discovery of the Egyptian Army boundary between the 2nd and 3rd Armies. 

(Game Recap)  With the early breakout of the 2 Egyptian Armies, the IDF must retreat and give up all the strategic passes in the Sinai, but the Sinai by itself, contains the buffer of space, whereas the Golan does not.  The failure to reduce and force the retreat of the IDF from the east bank of the Jordan River in the southern Golan may pose a problem for the Syrian's.  If Peled's 146th Ugda is able to break the Syrian line on the north shore of the Galilee, the Syrian 3rd Ar Division risks being isolated..........

At this point in the simulation, the events of the 1973 Yom Kippur War truely starts to deviate from the historical.  As stated at the beginning of the AAR, the military decisions of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) were going to be based on their historical actions in reference to the deployment of her reserves.  Based on military necessity, Laner's 240th and Peled's 146th Divisions or Ugda's, had to be sent to the Golan front initially for two reasons...1) Distance.  The Golan Heights were much closer to the assembly areas of the reserves than the Suez Canal.  2) The immediate threat to Israel proper.  The Syrian success on the southern Golan prevented any other decision to be made, regardless of what was happening on the Sinai front.  The breath of the Sinai itself gave the IDF time and space while it dealt with the crisis on the Golan.

The difference from the historical on the Golan is the Syrian attack was better coordinated and the collapse of the IDF defenses in the southern portion of the front was exploited, pushing the IDF to the west bank of the Jordan River. Again, both historically and within the AAR, the deployment of the IDF reserves to this front was a necessity.

In the Sinai, where Sharon's 143rd and Adan's 162nd Ugda's were assembled and deployed, the disjointed operations conducted by both on 8-9 Oct were historical. The Egyptian actions in the AAR on those days were not.  The failed attempts by the IDF to attack the prepared positions of the Egyptian forces on the east bank of the Canal were followed immediately by the 2nd and 3rd Army's breakout.  The results of those actions are shown below. Historically, they continued to improve their defenses and had no plans to continue advancing into the Sinai even though the IDF defenses were minimal.  It was only after the IDF counter attack on the Golan, its advance on Damascus, and Syrian calls for relief,  did the Egyptian's attempt to  advance, but the IDF defenses were better coordinated by that time.

 Regarding the Israeli Air Force (IAF),  the loses incurred during the AAR are much higher than the historical, but again, this is due to the successes of the Egyptian/Syrian attacks.  The IAF was the only force capable of slowing the initial advances of the Egyptian's/Syrian's and their heavy losses attest to that. The problem facing Israel is now she does not control the skies, allowing the Egyptian forces to come out from under their SAM umbrella.

The IDF faces a huge problem.  The Egyptian's have broken out of their bridgeheads and the 3rd Army has surrounded over a Bde of IDF forces defending the cross road town of Sadr El Hiltan. Even more threatening is the flanking of the IDF line by the Egyptian 4th Ar and GHQ Reseverve Mech Divisions.  On the Golan, the Syrian's are content with regaining the Golan Heights and have begun to dig in.  The IDF does not have the forces to conduct operations on both fronts simultaneously. Only a decisive move by the IDF on the Golan will Israel be able to turn the tide.

10 Oct, 1973

10 Oct, 1973...

In the north, the 2nd Army pushes up against Adan's defenses and threatens to break the IDF line in two.

Good read, bootlegger!  Sounds like the war is reaching a (perhaps *the*?) critical juncture.